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6 The primary institutions of
international society
The debate about pluralism and solidarism leads into the question of
the institutions of international society. It seems safe to say that there
will be a close relationship between where an international society is
located on the pluralist–solidarist spectrum, and either what type of in-
stitutions it has, or how it interprets any given institution. A number
of authors have, for example, tracked the evolution of sovereignty, re-
lating it, inter alia, to changes in the internal character of the dominant
states (Keohane 1995; Reus-Smit 1997; Barkin 1998; Sørensen 1999). The
concept of institutions is central to English school thinking for three
reasons: ﬁrst, because it ﬂeshes out the substantive content of interna-
tional society; second, because it underpins what English school writers
mean by ‘order’ in international relations; and third, because the partic-
ular understanding of institutions in English school thinking is one of
the main things that differentiates it from the mainstream, rationalist,
neoliberal institutionalist, study of international regimes. Quite a bit has
been written about the similarities and differences between the English
school approach to institutions and that of regime theory (Keohane 1988;
Hurrell 1991; Evans and Wilson 1992; Buzan 1993; Wæver 1998: 109–12;
Alderson and Hurrell 2000). There is general agreement that these two
bodies of literature overlap at several points, and that there is signiﬁcant
complementarity between them. The essential differences are:
(1) regime theory is more focused on contemporary events while the
English school has a mainly historical perspective;
(2) regime theory is primarily concerned with ‘particular human-
constructed arrangements, formally or informally organised’ (Keo-
hane 1988: 383), whereas the English school is primarily concerned
with ‘historically constructed normative structures’ (Alderson and
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Hurrell 2000: 27); the shared culture elements that precede rational
cooperation, orwhatKeohane (1988: 385) calls enduring ‘fundamen-
tal practices’ which shape and constrain the formation, evolution
and demise of the more speciﬁc institutions. Onuf (2002) labels this
distinction as ‘evolved’ versus ‘designed’ institutions.
(3) Closely tied to thepreviouspoint is that theEnglish school hasplaced
a lot of emphasis on the way in which the institutions of interna-
tional society and its members are mutually constitutive. To pick up
Manning’s metaphor of the game of states, for the English school
institutions deﬁne what the pieces are and how the game is played.
Regime theory tends to take both actors and their preferences as
given, and to deﬁne the game as cooperation under anarchy. This
difference is complemented and reinforced by one of method, with
regime theory largelywedded to rationalistmethod (Kratochwil and
Ruggie 1986), and the English school resting on history, normative
political theory and international legal theory;
(4) regime theory has applied itself intensively to institutionalisation
around economic and technological issues, both of which have been
neglected by the English school which has concentrated mainly on
the politico-military sector;
(5) regime theory has pursued its analysis mainly in terms of actors
pursuing self-interest using the mechanisms of rational cooperation;
while the English school has focused mainly on common interests
and sharedvalues, and themechanismsof internationalorder (Evans
and Wilson 1992: 337–9);
(6) de facto, but not in principle, regime theory has mainly studied sub-
global phenomena. Its stock-in-trade is studies of speciﬁc regimes,
which usually embody a subset of states negotiating rules about
some speciﬁc issue (ﬁshing, pollution, shipping, arms control, trade
etc.). The English school has subordinated the sub-global to the sys-
temic level, talking mainly about the character and operation of
international society as a whole.
The fact that there are two schools of thought within mainstream IR
(not to mention others outside IR) both claiming the concept of ‘insti-
tutions’ is in itself a recipe for confusion (Wæver 1998: 109–12). This
situation is not helped by a pervasive ambiguity in what differentiates
many of the associated concepts such as norms, rules and principles.
The ﬁrst section takes a brief look at the deﬁnitional problems with
these concepts. The second reviews how the concept of institutions is
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handled in the English school literature. The third examines the con-
cept of institutions through the lenses of hierarchy and functionalism,
with a particular look at the distinction between constitutive and reg-
ulatory rules. The fourth surveys the relationship between the range
of institutions and the types of international society. The ﬁfth section
concludes by reﬂecting on three questions: the relationship, if any, be-
tween institutions in the English school sense, and more materialist
structural interpretations of the samephenomena; and the twoquestions
left hanging in chapter 4 – one about how the interhuman, transnational
and interstate domains relate to each other, and the other about the
fate of the concepts ‘international’ and ‘world’ society in my structural
scheme.
Deﬁnitional problems
The terms ‘norms’, ‘rules’, ‘values’ and ‘principles’ are scattered
throughout the literature of both regime theory and the English school,
yet it is seldom clear what, if anything, differentiates them, and in many
usages they seeminterchangeable.Allare linkedby the idea that theirex-
istence should shape expectations about the behaviour of the members
of a social group. But what are the differences among shared norms and
shared values and shared principles? Are norms and rules just shaded
variations of the same thing? Perhaps the best-known attempt to con-
front this is Krasner’s (1983: 2; see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986:
769–71) deﬁnition of regimes as:
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making pro-
cedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and
rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour deﬁned in terms of rights
and obligations.Rules are speciﬁc prescriptions or proscriptions for ac-
tions. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making
and implementing collective choice.
This is quite helpful, but does not really produce clear, mutually exclu-
sive concepts. There does not, for example, seem to be much difference
between a principle understood as a belief of rectitude, and a norm
understood as behaviour deﬁned in terms of rights and obligations.
Principles might serve as general propositions from which rules can be
deduced, but inductive reasoning might also lead from rules to prin-
ciples. Krasner’s distinction between norms and rules seems to hinge
on the degree of formality. Both aim to regulate behaviour, and both
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carry the sense that they are authoritative, though neither can be seen as
causal (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 767). In Krasner’s scheme, norms
feelmore like the customs of a society,with rules occupying themore for-
mal, written,possibly legal end of the spectrum.Yet norms could also be
written down, and the general understanding of rules includes custom-
ary practices. It is fundamentally unclear how (or whether) these two
concepts can be disentangled. The task is not made easier by Krasner’s
opening move of declaring that all of these concepts can be ‘implicit or
explicit’ which weakens the basis for a distinction between norms and
rules on grounds of degree of (in)formality. It is also unclear what the
standing of ‘decision-making procedures’ is in this scheme. Identifying
them as ‘prevailing practices’ simply disguises the fact that they could
be principles, or norms or rules. They do not seem to be something that
falls outside the ﬁrst three concepts. Krasner does not mention values,
and this term is much more important in the English school literature
than in the regime theory one. A conventional understanding of val-
ues in the social sense is: the moral principles and beliefs or accepted
standards of a person or social group. ‘Moral principles and beliefs or
accepted standards’ easily embraces principles, norms and rules.
The unavoidable entanglements among Krasner’s concepts perhaps
explainwhy these terms are sooftengrouped together: ‘norms, rules and
principles’ or ‘norms, rules and institutions’. Even Kratochwil (1989: 10)
uses rules, norms and principles as synonyms, and though he promises
to distinguish them later in the book it is far from clear that he ever
does so. Despite the difﬁculties, Krasner’s formulation does suggest
some helpful distinctions that are worth keeping in mind. The idea that
norms represent the customary, implicit end of the authoritative social
regulation of behaviour, and rules the more speciﬁc, explicit end, can
often be useful, and I will try to retain that sense when I use the terms
separately.
The concept of institutions shares some of the ambiguities that attend
‘rules’. In common usage, ‘institution’ can be understood either in quite
speciﬁc terms as ‘an organisation or establishment founded for a spe-
ciﬁc purpose’, or in more general ones as ‘an established custom, law, or
relationship in a society or community’ (Hanks 1986). As noted above,
these different meanings play strongly into what distinguishes English
school theory from regime theory. Regime theory is mostly concerned
with the ﬁrst sense, though, as noted, regimes go beyond the idea of
intergovernmental organisation. Keohane (1988: 383–5) is keen to draw
a distinction between ‘speciﬁc institutions’ understood as things ‘that
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can be identiﬁed as related complexes of rules and norms, identiﬁable
in space and time’, and ‘more fundamental practices’ providing ‘insti-
tutionalized constraints at a more . . . enduring level’, a distinction also
pursued by Wæver (1998: 109–12). Keohane puts particular emphasis
on rules, arguing that speciﬁc institutions exist where there is a ‘per-
sistent set of rules’ that must ‘constrain activity, shape expectation, and
prescribe roles’. This conﬁnes his meaning of institution either to for-
mal organisations with ‘capacity for purposive action’ or international
regimes comprising ‘complexes of rules and organisations’, a distinc-
tion also made by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986). This comes close to
making the meaning of institution synonymous with intergovernmen-
tal organisations and legal frameworks.
Some IR deﬁnitions of institution act to blur these two meanings.
Krasner (1999: 43), for example, sees institutions as: ‘formal or informal
structures of norms and rules that are created by actors to increase their
utility’. This formulation seems to lean towards designed rather than
evolved institutions, but since ‘created’ is unmodiﬁed, could be read
either way. A more elaborate blurring is offered by March and Olson
(1998: 948): ‘“institution” can be viewed as a relatively stable collection
of practices and rulesdeﬁning appropriate behaviour for speciﬁcgroups
of actors in speciﬁc situations. Such practices and rules are embedded
in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and
legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated
with them’. Here the ﬁrst sentence seems to speak to Keohane’s speciﬁc
institutions, the second to his more fundamental practices. From the
Stanford school (Meyer et al. 1987: 13)we get adeﬁnition that leans quite
deﬁnitely towards the fundamental practices side: ‘We see institutions as
cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities
andactivities, integrating theminto larger schemes.We seebothpatterns
of activity and the units involved in them (individuals and other social
entities) as constructed by such wider rules.’
Although Wæver (1998: 112) thinks that the English school operates
across these meanings, and is confused about its position, a case can
be made that in fact it largely takes the second, more general, sense of
institution as its starting point. Bull (1977a: 40, 74) goes out of his way
to make clear that when he talks of institutions he does not mean in-
tergovernmental organisations or administrative machinery. Bull wants
to get at Keohane’s ‘fundamental practices’. Keohane mainly discusses
only one member of this category (sovereignty), which he also picks up
in later work (Keohane 1995), though he acknowledges that there are
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others, including Bull’s set (1988: 383). The English school has explored
a range of candidates within this deeper sense of institution, and it is on
this basis that much of its claim to distinctiveness rests.
Standing back from the IR debates, the English school’s understand-
ing of institutions feels close to that developed by Searle (1995). Searle
argues that institutions are created when a social function and status
are allocated to something but which do not reﬂect its intrinsic physical
properties. A wall keeps people out physically, whereas markers can do
so socially if accepted by those concerned. Money is the easiest example
where an exchange commodity evolved into paper money which has
no intrinsic value other than its status of recognition as money. Money,
and much else in the social world, is kept in place by collective agree-
ment or acceptance. Searle’s idea is that human societies contain large
numbers of institutions in this sense, and consequently large numbers
of what he calls ‘institutional facts’ resulting from them (e.g. husbands
and wives resulting from the institution of marriage). For Searle (1995:
2, 26) institutional facts are a subset of social facts, which arise out of
collective intentionality. Social facts are distinct from ‘brute’ facts which
exist without human thought affecting them. He notes (57) that ‘each
use of the institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the
users to the institution’, which underlines the concern with ‘practices’
in the IR literature on this subject.
Both the speciﬁc, designed, and the deeper, evolved understandings
represent legitimate interpretations of ‘institutions’, and there isnogood
reason for trying to exclude one or the other from its meaning. Neither
meaning is contested, and since the essential difference between them
is clear, the issue is simply to ﬁnd a way of clarifying which meaning
is in play. Given the inﬂuence of international law(yers) on Bull, it is
perhaps worth pointing out that the distinction between primary and
secondary institutions does not derive from Hart’s (1961: 79–99) well-
known formulation about primary and secondary rules. Hart’s concern
was to distinguish between primary rules (deﬁning (il)legitimate activ-
ity in any society), and secondary rules (which are about transforming
custom into a formal framework of law and justice). The institutions
talked about in regime theory are the products of a certain type of in-
ternational society (most obviously liberal, but possibly other types as
well), and are for themostpart consciouslydesigned by states.The insti-
tutions talked about by the English school are constitutive of both states
and international society in that they deﬁne the basic character and pur-
pose of any such society. For second-order societies (where themembers
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are themselves collective actors), such institutions deﬁne the units that
compose the society. Searle (1995: 35) argues that ‘social facts in gen-
eral, and institutional facts especially, are hierarchically structured’. On
this basis, and given that there is no disagreement about the English
school’s institutions reﬂecting something ‘more fundamental’, it
does not seem unreasonable to call what the English school (and the
Stanford school) wants to get at primary institutions, and those referred
to by regime theory as secondary institutions.
The concept of primary institutions in English
school literature
If the English school’s focus is primary institutions, how are these de-
ﬁned, and what range of possibilities is encompassed? Regime theorists
dealing with secondary institutions can make do with general deﬁni-
tions such as those provided by Krasner and Keohane. Within such
deﬁnitions there are nearly inﬁnite possibilities for types of formal or-
ganisation and regime. An indication of the type and range of diversity
can be found in the discussion about ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law referred to
in chapter 5, and the three independent variables (obligation, precision,
delegation) that produce degrees of hardness and softness in legalisa-
tion (Goldstein et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2000). Dealing with primary
institutions is a rather different proposition. Most English school writ-
ers spend little if any time deﬁning what they mean by ‘the institutions
of international society’, concentrating instead on listing and discussing
a relatively small number that they take to deﬁne the essence of what-
ever international society they are examining. Since the idea of primary
institutions is not controversial even for those who wish to focus on sec-
ondary institutions, the English school’s neglect of deﬁnitions, though
a shortcoming in its literature, does not weaken its general position.
Usage of the term ‘institutions’ within the English school literature ﬁts
pretty well with the key features of primary institutions identiﬁed by
others, viz.:
 that they are relatively fundamental and durable practices, that are
evolved more than designed; and
 that they are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate
activity in relation to each other.
With this understanding in mind, and given that the English school lit-
erature is the main one making a sustained effort to develop the idea
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of primary institutions for international society, it is worth surveying
its candidates for the primary institutions as a starting point for an in-
vestigation into what this universe might contain. It seems immediately
clear, for example, that second-order societies, being simpler and hav-
ing many fewer members than Searle’s ﬁrst-order human societies, will
contain a relatively small number of primary institutions.
Wight (1979: 111) says that ‘the institutions of international society
are according to its nature’, which implies that institutions will be dif-
ferent from one type of international society to another. This is consis-
tent with his more historical work (Wight 1977: 29–33, 47–9) in which
he identiﬁes various institutions of premodern international societies
including: messengers, conferences and congresses, a diplomatic lan-
guage, trade, religious sites and festivals. Wight does not attempt any
distinction between primary and secondary institutions, and his list
could be boiled down to diplomacy, trade, and religious sites and fes-
tivals. Also looking backward, Reus-Smit (1997) notes arbitration as a
distinctive feature of classical Greek international society, and Cohen
(1998) could easily be read as a study of diplomacy as an institution
in ancient and classical times. In a study of premodern China, Zhang
(2001) looks at sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power and a form
of ritual analogous to international law during China’s anarchic phase
(770–221 BC), and adds the idea that the tribute system was an insti-
tution of the classical Sino-centric international society in East Asia.
Warner (2001: 69–76) shows just how different from Westphalian mod-
els the institutions of classical Islamic international society were, in the
process illustrating both the contradictions when the West imposed it-
self, and the range of possibilities within the idea of primary institu-
tions. These ideas about premodern institutions suggest an evolution
from the simpler arrangements of tribes, city-states and empires in the
ancient and classical period, into the more sophisticated Westphalian
criteria of the modern states system, with some overlap in the role of
dynastic principles. Wight (1979: 111–12) goes on to enumerate those
of (what from the context is) the international society of the ﬁrst half
of the twentieth century, as: ‘diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and
neutrality’. Somewhat inconsistently, he then says that: ‘Diplomacy is
the institution for negotiating. Alliances are the institution for effect-
ing a common interest. Arbitration is an institution for the settlement
of minor differences between states. War is the institution for the ﬁnal
settlement of differences.’ Elsewhere Wight (1977: 110–52) puts a lot of
emphasis on diplomacy, sovereignty, international law and balance of
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power as distinctive to European international society, but he does not
anywhere draw together his various comments on institutions into a
coherent discussion.
Bull puts institutions on the map for the English school, and his set
of ﬁve institutions of ‘international’ (= interstate) society (diplomacy,
international law, the balance of power, war and the role of great pow-
ers) occupies the whole central third of his 1977 book. Yet Bull never
gives a full deﬁnition of what constitutes an institution, nor does he set
out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from this category. Neither
does he attempt to explain the difference between his set and Wight’s.
Both by noting Wight’s institutions for premodern international soci-
eties, and by himself setting out a variety of alternative possibilities for
future international society, Bull appears to accept the idea that primary
institutions can and do change, but he offers little guidance about how
institutions arise and disappear. His core statement on institutions is
ﬁrmly within the Westphalian straitjacket (1977: 74):
States collaborate with one another, in varying degrees, in what may
be called the institutions of international society: the balance of power,
international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system
of the great powers, and war. By an institution we do not necessarily
imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of
habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals.
These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying
out the political functions of international society, or serve as a surro-
gate central authority in the international system. They are rather an
expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging
their political functions – and at the same time a means of sustaining
this collaboration.
The location of this set in the overall structure of Bull’s argument is that
they derive from the second of his three types of rules: rules of coexist-
ence, which are those setting out the minimum behavioural conditions
for society (see chapter 2). In Bull’s scheme, rules of coexistencehinge on
the basic elements of society: limits to violence, establishment of prop-
erty rights and sanctity of agreements. This placing explains both the
pluralist character of these institutions (which occurs by deﬁnition as
‘rules of coexistence’) and the curious absence of sovereignty (which
falls under Bull’s ﬁrst set of rules about the constitutive normative prin-
ciple of world politics). Indeed, Bull (1977a: 71) does say that ‘it is states
themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states’, but
he does not develop this idea, whereas the other ﬁve get a chapter each.
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Bull’s presentation of institutions can be read in two ways: either it
reﬂects his pluralist predisposition, or it reﬂects his understanding of
the history and present condition of interstate society. As argued in
chapter 2, there is scope in Bull’s institutions for solidarist develop-
ment. But he makes little attempt to explore this, or to develop a general
deﬁnition of primary institutions, or to explore the range of possibili-
ties that might be covered by ‘institutions of international society’. One
possible lead for such an exploration is suggested by the link between
Bull’s choice of institutions, and the explicitly functional quality of his
understanding of society. Do his ideas about society being constituted
by limits to violence, establishment of property rights and sanctity of
agreements open a functional path into thinking about primary institu-
tions? More on this below.
Bull’s failure both to give a clear deﬁnition of (primary) institutions,
and to relate to earlier work, continues into, and in some ways worsens
within, the more contemporary English school literature. For example,
Mayall (2000: 149–50) says:
The framework that I have adopted describes the context of interna-
tional relations in terms of a set of institutions – law, diplomacy, the
balance of power etc. – and principles. Some of these – sovereignty,
territorial integrity and non-intervention – have been around since the
beginning of the modern states-system. Others – self-determination,
non-discrimination, respect for fundamental human rights etc. – have
been added more recently . . . do all these institutions and principles
have equal weight, or are they arranged in a hierarchy? And if so, is it
ﬁxed?
Curiously, he does not mention nationalism, which might be thought to
be his major contribution to the English school literature (Mayall 1990,
2000), andwhich clearlymeets the criteria for primary institutions given
above. Mayall (2000: 94) identiﬁes international law as a kind of master
institution: ‘the bedrock institution on which the idea of international
society stands or falls’. This view is supported by Kratochwil’s (1989:
251) argument that: ‘the international legal order exists simply by virtue
of its role in deﬁning the game of international relations’, and Nardin’s
(1998: 20; see, contra Nardin, Whelan 1998: 50–1) that ‘international so-
ciety is not merely regulated by international law, but constituted by
it’. The arguments made in chapter 2 about the centrality of positive
international law to international society might also be taken as rea-
son to privilege international law in this way. Aside from Mayall’s
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exasperating etceteras, which leave one wondering what the full sets
might look like, we are offered a distinction between institutions and
principles with no explanation as to what the difference might be, or
any clear setting out of which items belong in which category. His good
questions about weight and change seem to apply to both together, and
therefore to suggest that perhaps there is no difference, and Mayall in
any case does not attempt to answer them.
Perhaps picking up on Bull’s undeveloped point, and in contrast to
Mayall’s and Kratochwil’s elevation of international law, James (1999:
468) says that sovereignty is ‘the constitutive principle of interstate rela-
tions’, though in earlier work (James 1978) he identiﬁes diplomacy, in-
ternational law and sovereignty as the key ‘phenomena’ indicating the
presence of international society. Interestingly, James (1978: 3) also hints
at a functional understanding of institutions by talking of sovereignty
in terms of rules about who can be a member of international society.
The emphasis on sovereignty is also shared by Jackson (2000: 102–12),
who although he does not mount a direct discussion of institutions, also
talks about diplomacy, colonialism, international law and war in terms
compatiblewith an institutionalview.Reus-Smit (1997) focuses on inter-
national law and multilateralism as the key contemporary institutions
of interstate society, and Keohane (1995) also seems to lean towards
multilateralism. To add to the mixture, some solidarists (Knudsen 1999:
39ff.) want to push human rights almost to the status of an institution,
while others (Wheeler 2000) talk about it more ambiguously in terms
of a norm of international society. As with Mayall’s distinction between
institutions and principles, it is not clear what, if anything, draws the
line between institutions and norms of international society. Both carry
a sense of being durable features (and in that sense social structures) of
a society, and both are about constituting roles and actors, and shaping
expectations of behaviour.
If the concept of primary institutions is to play a coherent role in
English school theory, then we need to improve our understanding of
what it does and does not represent. The existing discussion suggests
several points needing further thought:
 that there is an urgent need to acknowledge the centrality of primary
institutions in English school theory, to generate consistency in theuse
and understanding of the concept and to make clear what does and
does not count as a primary institution;
171
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 10:56:05 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616617.009
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
From International to World Society?
 thatBull’s classic set of ﬁve institutions ismuchmorea statement about
historical pluralist international societies than any kind of universal,
for-all-time set, and that consequently there is a need to ﬂesh out the
wider range of primary institutions;
 that institutions can change, and that processes of creation and decay
need to be part of the picture;
 that perhaps not all primary institutions are equal, and that some sort
of hierarchy may need to be introduced;
 that a functional understanding of primary institutions is worth
investigating.
A timely paper by Holsti (2002) has begun a systematic and stimulat-
ing attempt to take the taxonomy of primary international institutions
in hand. Holsti’s starting point is a concern to develop primary institu-
tions as benchmarks for monitoring signiﬁcant change in international
systems. Holsti (2002: 6) sees institutions in this sense as embodying
‘three essential elements: practices, ideas and norms/rules’ in varying
mixtures. He adds (Holsti 2002: 9–10) a key distinction between ‘foun-
dational’ and ‘procedural’ institutions: ‘Foundational institutionsdeﬁne
and give privileged status to certain actors. They also deﬁne the funda-
mental principles, rules and norms upon which their mutual relations
are based.’ Procedural institutions are: ‘repetitive practices, ideas and
norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between
the separate actors’, including ‘the conduct of both conﬂict and normal
intercourse’. Although Holsti divides institutions into two types, it is
clear that he is not repeating the division between primary and sec-
ondary institutions: his procedural institutions are still primary in con-
cept, not regimes or IGOs. Like Mayall, Holsti shies away from giving
deﬁnitive lists, but he includes as foundational institutions sovereignty,
states, territoriality and the fundamental principles of international law.
Among procedural institutions he includes diplomacy, war, trade and
colonialism. A similar move is made by Reus-Smit (1997: 556–66), when
he identiﬁes three layers in modern international society. The deepest
layer he calls ‘constitutional structures’, which are similar to Holsti’s
foundational institutions. Constitutional structures reﬂect a hierarchy
of ‘deep constitutive values: a shared belief about the moral purpose of
centalized political organisation, an organising principle of sovereignty,
and a norm of pure procedural justice’. Picking up the functional theme
he says that these structures ‘are coherent ensembles of intersubjective
beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering
172
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 10:56:05 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616617.009
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
The primary institutions of international society
international societies: they deﬁne what constitutes a legitimate actor,
entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they deﬁne the
basic parameters of rightful state action’. The middle layer Reus-Smit
calls ‘fundamental institutions’, which he sees as ‘basic rules of practice’
such as bilateralism,multilateralism and international law.Thisdoesnot
feel quite the same as Holsti’s procedural institutions, but the concept
is not elaborated enough to tease out the difference either in principle
or practice, and the difference is perhaps not large. Reus-Smit’s third
layer is ‘issue-speciﬁc regimes’, which brings us back to the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary institutions. Although they con-
tain some embellishments, both Holsti’s and Reus-Smit’s deﬁnitions of
primary institutions are broadly in line with the deﬁnitions discussed
above.
Holsti’s approach tackles the question of change and evolution in in-
ternational institutions and thereby allows both entry into and exit from
Bull’spluralistmodel. In this aspect,hiswork runs inparallelwithothers
who have not only focused on institutions, but also on the process of
institutionalisation. Krasner (1999: 44) raises the question of ‘durability’
which he deﬁnes as whether principles and norms endure or change
with change of circumstances. The Stanford school (Meyer et al. 1987:
13) deﬁne institutionalisation as: ‘the process by which a given set of
units and a pattern of activities come to be normatively and cognitively
held in place, and practically taken for granted as lawful (whether as a
matter of formal law, custom or knowledge)’. March and Olsen (1998:
959–69) draw attention to the way in which the development of inter-
action and competence tends to lead to institutionalisation, and to the
need to study how political history evolves in terms of institutions. I
will look more closely at the process of institutionalisation in chapter 8.
Holsti shows how new institutions arise (trade), and some old ones
drop out of use altogether (colonialism – see also Keene, 2002: 60–144),
and it is apparent that any study of institutional dynamics must incor-
porate both the rise and consolidation of institutions and their decay
and demise. He argues that war has decayed as an institution of con-
temporary international society, taking a similar view to Mayall’s (2000:
19) remark that in the twentieth century war became regarded more as
the breakdown of international society than as a sign of its operation.
Other institutions have become much more elaborate and complicated
(international law, dipomacy). In general, Holsti sets up a scheme that
invites observers to look not just for the existence (or not) of institutions,
but whether the trend is for those that do exist to strengthen, weaken
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Table 1. Candidates for primary institutions of international society by authorc
Wight Bull Mayalla Holstib James Jackson
Religious sites and
festivals
Dynastic principles
Trade Trade (P)
Diplomacy Diplomacy Diplomacy (I) Diplomacy(P) Diplomacy Diplomacy
Alliances
Guarantees
War War War (P) War
Neutrality
Arbitration
Balance of Power Balance of Power, Balance of Power (I)
Great power
management
International Law International Law International Law (I) International Law (F) International Law International Law
The State The State (F)
Sovereignty Sovereignty (P) Sovereignty (F) Sovereignty Sovereignty
Territorial Integrity (P) Territoriality (F) Political boundaries
Nonintervention (P)
Self-Determination (P)
Non-Discrimination (P)
Human Rights (P)
Colonialism (P) Colonialism
Notes: a for Mayall (I) = institution and (P) = principle
b for Holsti (F) = foundational institution and (P) = procedural institution
c words underlined are where the author identiﬁes an institution as ‘principal’, or ‘master’ or ‘bedrock’.
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or evolve internally. Holsti’s scheme, and Reus-Smit’s, also address
explicitly the question of hierarchy among primary institutions, and
not just between primary and secondary ones, though more think-
ing is needed about this. Holsti’s statement (2002: 13) that sovereignty
is ‘the bedrock for all other international institutions’, reinforces the
discord between, on the one hand, the seemingly similar positions of
Alan James and Robert Jackson cited above, and on the other, Mayall’s,
Kratochwil’s and Nardin’s virtually identical statements about interna-
tional law. The whole idea of ‘bedrock institutions’ seems to suggest a
special status for some even within the foundational category. It is also
unclear in these discussions whether the claims for bedrock status are
general to any interstate society, or speciﬁc to the Westphalian one and
its contemporaryderivative. In addition,Holsti’s inclusionof the state as
a foundational institution alongside sovereignty and territoriality looks
problematic. It is not clear that anything of consequence is left if one
subtracts sovereignty and territoriality from the state. Neither is it clear
that the state ﬁts within Holsti’s deﬁnition. If, as he says, ‘foundational
institutions deﬁne and give privileged status to certain actors . . . [and]
the fundamental principles, rules and norms upon which their mutual
relations are based’, then actors cannot be primary institutions. This ar-
gument alsoundercutsBull’sunexplored classiﬁcation of the state as the
principal institution of international society. Primary institutions have
to reﬂect some shared principle, norm or value. In this instance, states
would be the actors constituted by the combination of sovereignty and
territoriality.
Although not identifying all of the writers who have had something
to say about primary institutions, the current state of play on primary
institutions in English school literature is roughly summarised in table 1.
One might want to add to it Reus-Smit’s and Keohane’s idea that
multilateralism is an institution if not of interstate society globally, at
least amongst the Western states and their circle.
This summary is inspiring because it is clearly getting at something
basic and important about international social structure that is not cov-
ered either by secondary institutions or by Wendt’s broad classiﬁcation
of basic types of social order. It is also both instructive and a bit de-
pressing. It is depressing because it reveals something approaching in-
difference towards both conceptual clarity and cumulative debate. The
English school’s interest in primary institutionsmight be a candidate for
the ‘coherent research program’ that Keohane (1988: 392) accuses the re-
ﬂectivists of lacking, but to qualify will require much more systematic
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thinking than it has received so far. The summary is instructive on two
grounds. First, because it suggests that there is a lot more to primary
institutions than sovereignty. As Onuf (2002: 228) astutely observes, it
is a feature of realist thinking that ‘sovereignty is the only rule that
matters for the constitution of anarchy’. A systematic approach through
primary institutions would thus settle once and for all what it is that
differentiates English school theory from realism. Second, primary in-
stitutions do have some kind of life-cycle in which they rise, evolve
and decline, and this dynamic itself needs to be a focus of study (more
on this in chapter 8). The summary also suggests a recurrent desire to
differentiate primary institutions into some sort of hierarchy between
the deeper and more constitutive, and the less deep and more procedu-
ral. Alongside this, and not clearly connected to it, are the hints about
a functional understanding of primary institutions. How can one be-
gin to transform the English school’s lists into a coherent taxonomy? I
will begin with ideas about hierarchy and then turn to the functional
question.
Hierarchy and functionalism within
primary institutions
What lies behind the persistent tendency in writings about primary in-
stitutions either toﬁnger someone institutionas ‘primary’ or ‘master’, or
to make some more general distinction (Mayall’s institutions and prin-
ciples; Holsti’s procedural and foundational institutions; Reus-Smit’s
constitutional structures and fundamental institutions). The idea of a
‘primary’ or ‘master’ institution implies that one deep practice essen-
tially generates or shapes all of the others. The idea of two layers of
primary institutions implies that some are ‘deeper’ than others.
Looking ﬁrst at the notion of layers, Holsti’s and Reus-Smit’s dis-
tinctions are based on the idea that some (procedural/foundational)
institutions are about repetitive practices and interactions, while others
(foundational/constitutional structures) are about how the actors and
the basic rules of the game among them are constituted. A distinction
along these lines is similar to the one used by Ruggie (1998) and others
(e.g. Kratochwil 1989: 26; Searle 1995: 27–8; Sørensen 1999) between reg-
ulative and constitutive rules. Since, as argued above (pp. 163–7),norms,
rules, principles and values all overlap, and since institutions embody
all of them, it seems reasonable to transpose the logic developed around
constitutive and regulatory rules, to thediscussion aboutdifferent types
176
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 10:56:05 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616617.009
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
The primary institutions of international society
of primary institutions. Regulative rules are intended to have causal
effects on a pre-existing activity, while ‘constitutive rules deﬁne the set
of practices that make up any particular consciously organised social
activity . . . they specify what counts as that activity’ (Ruggie 1998: 22).
Searle (1995: 114) argues that ‘institutions always consist in constitutive
rules (practices, procedures) that have the form X counts as Y in context
C’. It seems that the strange status of the state in Bull’s scheme, and
his silence about sovereignty, reﬂect the positioning of his institutions
within his ‘rules of coexistence’ category, which leaves out the institu-
tions to be found under his constitutive rules. Bull thus comes close
to falling foul of the criticism made by Ruggie (1998: 25) of neorealists
and neoliberals, that they exclude constitutive rules, and that ‘the scope
of their theories . . . is conﬁned to regulative rules that coordinate be-
haviour in a pre-constituted world’. Yet that would not be quite fair,
since several of Bull’s institutions do seem to ﬁt under Holsti’s ‘foun-
dational’ category and Ruggie’s ‘constitutive’ one. At ﬁrst glance, it is
not exactly clear how one would interpret Bull’s three types of rules in
the light of Holsti’s and Ruggie’s dyadic classiﬁcations. Bull’s consti-
tutive rules probably ﬁt within Holsti’s foundational institutions and
Ruggie’s constitutive rules. His rules of cooperation probably ﬁt within
Holsti’s procedural institutions and Ruggie’s regulative rules, and may
also overlap with secondary institutions. But quite where Bull’s rules
of coexistence, and hence his ﬁve institutions, ﬁt, is not immediately
obvious. We are in the murky waters signposted by Hurrell (2002a:
145) when he noted the absence of any clear answer as to what ac-
tually are ‘the most important constitutive rules in international rela-
tions’. One thing that is clear is that this debate is about a different
concern from Hart’s (1961) distinction between primary and secondary
rules, which is more narrowly aimed at how custom is transformed into
law.
Just what does count as constitutive in relation to interstate societies?
Since the English school has in part justiﬁed its distinctiveness from
(mainly American) regime theory by pointing to the constitutive quality
of what it means by institutions, getting some sort of coherent answer
to this question is essential to the standing of English school theory.
As already noted, Bull’s idea of constitutive rules is the social struc-
tural analogue to Waltz’s ﬁrst tier of structure, comprising the ordering
principle of the system that deﬁnes whether it is a society of states, a
universal empire, a cosmopolitan society or whatever. Bull’s rules of
coexistence are heavily shaped by the prior choice of sovereign
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territorial states within this ﬁrst tier of constitutive rules. The rules
of coexistence then set out the minimum behavioural conditions for
society, in other words a kind of bottom line necessary for some sort
of interstate society to exist. Holsti’s and Reus-Smit’s deepest layers
deﬁne both the key actors and the fundamental principles, rules and
norms upon which their mutual relations are based. Ruggie’s idea is
that constitutive rules deﬁne the set of practices that make up any par-
ticular consciously organised social activity, with the example of a game
(e.g. chess – Searle 1995: 27–8) giving clear guidance. As in chess, the
rules deﬁne the pieces, the environment in which the pieces act, and
the ways in which they relate to each other and that environment. Tak-
ing all these ideas together, and staying with a game metaphor (chess,
or Manning’s game of states) it becomes apparent that there are two
core elements in the idea of constitutive institutions: one is that such
institutions deﬁne the main pieces/players in the game; the other that
they deﬁne the basic rules by which the pieces/players relate to each
other.
This sounds relatively simple, but is not. One problem concerns the
separability of pieces/players on the one hand, and the rules of en-
gagement on the other. These might be separate (as in chess), but they
might also be linked, as in the mutual constitution resolution to the
agent–structure problem. Sovereignty as the deﬁning quality of states
(pieces/players) cannot be disentangled from anarchy as the deﬁn-
ing quality of system structure (and therefore the rules of the game).
This link is dynamic, and as the several accounts of the evolution of
sovereignty noted above make clear, both states and the game they play
change over time. Sovereignty may stay constant as the key constitu-
tive institution, but the practices that it legitimises are under continuous
renegotiation.This changeabilitywithin a constant is less of a contrast to
chess than might be imagined; the rules of chess have changed quite fre-
quently without the identity of the game coming into question (Hassner
2003). A second problem lies in the conﬂation of ‘pieces’ and ‘players’.
In chess, the pieces are constituted by the rules, but the pieces are not
the players, and although the activity of chess may be constituted by its
rules, the people who play it are not (except in the very limited sense of
being temporarily constituted as chess players). In the game of states,
this distinction is much less clear. The pieces and the players are still
separable (pieces = states, players = political leaders and diplomats),
but they are closely interlinked, as captured in the distinction between
‘role’ and ‘idiosyncratic’ variables in the studyof foreign-policy-making.
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Where the pieces (states) are composed of sentient social actors, then
what the pieces are and how they relate to each other will inevitably be
connected. On this basis Holsti and Reus-Smit would seem to be correct
in proposing that for the game of states, constitutive institutions must
deﬁne both the main actors and the basic rules by which they relate to
each other.
What does such a conclusion mean in practical terms? The clearest
candidates for the status of constitutive institutions will be those that
bear directly on the deﬁnition of the principal actors/players in the
game. Taking the cue from Bull’s discussion of constitutive principles,
for the game of states in Westphalian form the key constitutive institu-
tions would be sovereignty and territoriality, for the game of empires, it
wouldbe suzerainty, for a cosmopolitian community itwouldbehuman
rights, and for a neomedieval system it would be the set of principles
that differentiated the main types of actors and set out their rights and
responsibilities in relation to each other. For something like the EU, the
constitutive institution remains sovereignty, but accompanied by in-
tegration and ‘subsidiarity’ (the investment of authority at the lowest
possible level of an institutional hierarchy – McLean 1996: 482). It is not
impossible for some of these rules to coexist. During the colonial era, for
example, the European states system was constituted by sovereignty,
but the European powers related to the rest of the world on the basis of
suzerainty, which deﬁned a range of imperial entities from dominions
through protectorates to colonies. Holsti (and Keene, 2000, 2002) are
thus quite right to identify colonialism as a key institution of pre-1945
European international society. Thinking just about what constitutes
the actors/players pushes one towards the idea of ‘master’ or ‘princi-
pal’ primary institutions, where perhaps one or two key foundational
practices do seem to set up the rest of the game.
Moving to constitutive institutions focused on the basic rules of en-
gagement is more difﬁcult. Where is the boundary between what counts
as ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ rules (coexistence for Bull, rules that de-
ﬁne the game for Ruggie, fundamental principles deﬁning relations for
Holsti and Reus-Smit), and cooperation/regulative/procedural rules?
Bull’s idea of rules of cooperation being about secondary issues (those
more advanced rules agreed by states beyond mere coexistence) looks
immediately problematic. Such rules can include trade and human
rights, both of which might well count as constitutive in the sense that
they impact quickly and deeply on what practices are legitimised (or
not) by sovereignty, and therefore how the key players are deﬁned.
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Both Holsti’s and Reus-Smit’s procedural rules and Ruggie’s regula-
tive ones are trying to deﬁne a level that is relatively superﬁcial in
the sense that it downplays or eliminates the constitutive element.
Holsti’s procedural institutions are: ‘repetitive practices, ideas and
norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between
the separate actors’, Ruggie’s regulative rules ‘are intended to have
causal effects on a pre-existing activity’. The idea here is to capture,
as it were, the regular practices that sentient players engage in once the
actors are established, the basic rules are in place and the game of states
isunderway.But this seemingly clear distinction ishard to sustain.Even
at the level of secondary institutions there are plausible claims that the
buildup of networks of regimes eventually entangles states to such an
extent as to change quite fundamentally the nature of relations among
them (more legal and institutionalised, less war) and thus to call into
question the (neo)realist understanding of what anarchy means. Such
claims are intrinsic to much of the discussion of globalisation and world
society, and are not difﬁcult to ﬁnd in other literatures (Keohane and
Nye 1977; Wendt 1999; Milner 1991). In effect, such claims connect even
secondary institutions, at least in their cumulative effect as expressions
of the primary institution of multilateralism, to constitutive status.
Holsti counts both trade andwar asprocedural institutions, yet there are
compelling arguments that both have major effects on the constitution
and behaviour of states (e.g. Keohane and Nye 1977; Tilly 1990).
One key element in the difﬁculty of drawing a boundary between
constitutive institutions and regulatory rules is the breakdown of the
analogy between games such as chess where the pieces are not the play-
ers, and games such as ‘states’ where the pieces and the players are
more closely intertwined. In the game of states, the players can reinter-
pret existing institutions as they go along. Ashley’s (1987: 411) seem-
ingly convoluted deﬁnition of international community is close to the
sense of primary institutions, and captures this idea of essential ﬂuidity
well:
international community can only be seen as a never completed prod-
uct of multiple historical practices, a still-contested product of struggle
to impose interpretation upon interpretation. In its form it can only
be understood as a network of historically fabricated practical under-
standings, precedents, skills, and procedures that deﬁne competent
international subjectivity and that occupy a precariously held social
space pried open amidst contending historical forces, multiple inter-
pretations and plural practices.
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As Holsti’s discussion makes clear, within the game of states, even quite
basic institutions (colonialism in his set, which does deﬁne actors in
the system) can disappear as the game evolves, or at least atrophy to
the point where the label is no longer an acceptable way of charac-
terising practices. Holsti tracks substantial changes of interpretation in
other primary institutions aswell, such as sovereignty (see alsoKeohane
1995;Barkin 1998; Sørensen 1999),war and international law.The shared
norms or principles represented by primary institutions can endure in
a general sense, while the particular rules and institutional facts that
they legitimise undergo substantial change. The problem is how to dis-
tinguish between those institutions that change the nature of the game
and the character of the key players, and those that don’t. Drawing any
such distinction in a deﬁnitive way is certain to be both difﬁcult and
controversial. There is endless scope for dispute as to what extent new
institutions (the market, or human rights) change either the game or the
players, and over what time periods they do so. In terms of the discus-
sion in chapter 5, the question is: does solidarism change the game of
states, and at what point do those changes add up to a new game for
which the name ‘game of states’ is no longer appropriate? A suggestive
answer to this question is provided by the tendency of EU studies to
drift away from both IR and Politics, implying that at least in the minds
of many of those who study it, the EU cannot be adequately understood
either as a state or as a game of states.
Taking all of this into consideration, one can make the follow-
ing general characterisation of the primary institutions of interstate
society.
 Primary institutions are durable and recognised patterns of shared
practices rooted invaluesheld commonlyby themembers of interstate
societies, amd embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles. In
some cases these shared practices and values may be extended to, and
accepted by, non-state actors.
 In order to count as a primary institution, such practices must play a
constitutive role in relation to both the pieces/players and the rules
of the game. There is probably not a useful distinction to be made
between constitutive and regulatory (or fundamental and procedural)
primary institutions.
 Although durable, primary institutions are neither permanent nor
ﬁxed. They will typically undergo a historical pattern of rise, evo-
lution and decline that is long by the standards of a human lifetime.
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Changes in the practices within an institution may be a sign of vigour
and adaptation (as those in sovereignty over the last couple of cen-
turies) or of decline (as in the narrowing legitimacy of war over the
last half-century). One needs to distinguish between changes in and
changes of primary institutions.
Although I have argued that a constitutive/regulatory distinction
cannot be used as the basis for a hierarchy within primary institutions,
the sense in the literature that there needs to be a hierarchy is strong. It is
also uncontestable that there needs to be a better taxonomy of primary
institutions. The simplest solution to the hierarchy problem is to treat it
as an issue of nesting. Some primary institutions can be understood as
containing, or generating others. International law, for example, can be
seen as a general institution, a set of fundamental principles, and also
as the container of the potentially endless particular laws about a wide
variety of speciﬁc issues that can be built up within it, and which mostly
fall under what I have labelled here as secondary institutions. The trick
is to ﬁnd primary institutions that stand alone. Looking again at table 1,
it is clear that some of the candidates do stand alone, whereas others are
derivative.
Sovereignty is a good candidate for a master institution of West-
phalian international society. Within it one could bundle up May-
all’s ‘principles’ of non-intervention, self-determination and non-
discrimination. A good case could be made for seeing international law
as derivative from sovereignty. Although there could, in principle, be
international law without sovereignty, as Mosler (1980: 1) argues, before
sovereignty, in ancient and classical times, there was no conception of
a universal community of rules or laws (on this question see Onuma
2000; Zhang 2001). Without international law, it is difﬁcult to imag-
ine much international relations among sovereign entities other than
war.
Territoriality, or territorial integrity, is distinct from sovereignty and
not necessary to it. Sovereignty can in principle exist without being
territorial, even though in practice that might be difﬁcult to implement.
Territoriality is therefore a distinct master institution of Westphalian
interstate societies (Ruggie 1993). It might be argued that boundaries
are a derivative institution from territoriality, though it could also be
argued that territoriality and boundaries are opposite sides of the same
coin. As argued above, sovereignty and territoriality together constitute
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the essence of the Westphalian state, and so eliminate Bull’s and Holsti’s
attempt to see the state itself as a primary institution.
Diplomacy is another good candidate for a master institution. In his-
torical terms, it predates sovereignty, and it easily bundles up Wight’s
messengers, conferences and congresses, diplomatic language, and
arbitration and Reus-Smit’s multilateralism.
Balance of power is a clear fourth Westphalian master institution.
When understood as a recognised social practice, and shared value,
rather than as a mechanical consequence of anarchy, balance of power
contains alliances, guarantees,neutrality and greatpowermanagement.
It also contains war, again when understood as a social practice (Searle
1995: 89–90), which as Wight noted, is ‘the institution for the ﬁnal
settlement of differences’.
Of the list in table 1, that leaves religious sites and festivals, dynastic
principles, trade, human rights and colonialism as not clearly deriva-
tive or subordinate to any other master institution. Religious sites and
festivals have dropped away as a feature of modern European interna-
tional society, but clearly played a central role in ancient and classical
times, and retain unquestionable importance in sub-global international
societies, notably those of the Islamic, Jewish and Hindu worlds. Dy-
nastic principles have also faded out of European international society,
but they were crucial in its early phases, and were prominent also in
ancient and classical times. Trade is another very old practice in hu-
man affairs and does not depend on any of the four master institutions
listed above (Buzan and Little 2000). Whether trade as such is the in-
stitution, or particular principles applying to it, such as protectionism,
or the market, is an interesting question needing more thought. A good
case can be made that over the past century and a half, there has been
a battle between these two principles of how to govern trade, and that
since the end of the Cold War, the market has emerged clearly as one of
the major primary institutions of contemporary interstate society. Even
with that resolution, however, there remains a vigorous battle between
‘economic’ and ‘embedded’ liberals for the soul of the market. As noted
above, human rights is a cosmopolitan institution, but it can also be
picked up as a shared value in an interstate society. Probably it is not a
master institution in itself, but derivative from the principle of equality
of people established as part of decolonisation. Conversely, colonialism
was a derivative primary institution of international society up to 1945,
resting on the general principle of inequality of peoples.
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Table 2. The nested hierarchy of international institutions
Primary Institutions
Master Derivative
Sovereignty Non-intervention
International law
Territoriality Boundaries
Diplomacy Messengers/diplomats
Conferences/Congresses
Multilateralism
Diplomatic language
Arbitration
Balance of power Anti-hegemonism
Alliances
Guarantees
Neutrality
War
Great power management
Equality of people Human Rights
Humanitarian intervention
Inequality of people Colonialism
Dynasticism
Trade Market
Protectionism
Hegemonic stability
Nationalism Self-determination
Popular sovereignty
Democracy
On the basis of this discussion, and setting aside religious sites and
festivals, and dynastic principles on the grounds that they are mostly
of historical interest, a simple logic of nesting generates a preliminary
pattern of master and derivative primary institutions applying to mod-
ern interstate societies as set out in table 2. I am aware that some will
ﬁnd the dispositions in table 2 controversial, and I offer them more as
a way of opening than of closing a debate about nesting as one way of
dealing with the problem of hierarchy within primary institutions that
is not resolved by the distinction between constitutive and regulatory
rules.
Of course tables 1 and 2 do not contain all of the possible primary
institutions, and neither do they tell us what the contemporary pat-
tern looks like. Given the pluralist dispositions of the authors involved,
these lists have not only an interstate, but also a speciﬁc Westphalian
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bias, and even there are not complete. One thing that is noticeable about
trade, human rights and colonialism in relation to sovereignty, territori-
ality, diplomacy and balance of power, is that they don’t ﬁt comfortably
together. Sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy and balance of power are
a harmonious set. They do not guarantee peace, but they complement
each other comfortably and contain no necessary contradictions. The
market, human rights and colonialism raise contradictions. The contra-
diction between human rights on the one hand, and sovereignty/non-
intervention on the other is well developed in the English school liter-
ature (Bull 1977a; Mayall 2000; Jackson 2000). Colonialism contradicts
sovereignty by creating a society of unequals, a mix of Westphalian
and imperial forms (Keene 2002). The market principle creates tensions
with sovereignty and territoriality, not to mention balance of power,
in ways that have been well explored in the literatures of IPE and
globalisation.
Given theproblem of contradictions, it isnotwithout signiﬁcance that
nationalism which, given its importance as the political legitimiser for
sovereignty, might well be thought a quite longstanding master institu-
tion of interstate society, is not part of table 1. Like trade, human rights
and colonialism, nationalism, and its corollaries popular sovereignty
and the right of self-determination, create contradictions with some of
the other master institutions (sovereignty, territoriality, trade, even at
times diplomacy), a story well told by Mayall (1990). Nationalism, as
Mayall (2000: 84) notes, sacralises territory by making sovereignty pop-
ular. It can also underpin the solidarist call, derided by Jackson (2000:
366) to make democracy a universal institution of interstate society. It
is perhaps no accident that the English school classics avoided talk of
trade and nationalism for fear of disrupting the harmony of their core
Westphalian set of institutions. Bull, and more recently Jackson, put the
pursuit of order as their ﬁrst priority. A consequent disinclination to
take on board disruptive institutions would be of a piece with their
often ﬁerce resistance to human rights, which creates similar tensions.
Although the potential for contradictions among primary institutions
is real, it is also sometimes overdone. The fear that the WTO regime
degrades sovereignty by imposing rules and restrictions on states, for
example, is a common part of the debate about globalisation. In defence,
the OECD (1998: 13–14, 77–90) argues that since states agree to the rules
in pursuit of what they deﬁne as their own national interests, the trade
regime is an exercise of sovereignty, not a surrender of it. This line is
close to Manning’s, cited in chapter 2, that ‘What is essentially a system
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of law for sovereigns, being premised on their very sovereignty, does
not, by the fact of being strengthened, put in jeopardy the sovereign-
ties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence. Not, at any
rate, in logic.’ Those classics of the English school that subordinate the
exploration of tensions among primary institutions to the concern for
order, block one of the most interesting insights to be gained from the
study of primary institutions: that tensions among them are a key driv-
ing force in the evolution of interstate society. More on this in chapters 7
and 8.
Another missing primary institution is environmentalism, discussed
by Jackson (2000: 175–8) as a fourth area of responsibility (after national,
international and humanitarian) involving stewardship or trusteeship
of the planet. This was little, if at all, discussed by earlier English school
writers, in part because the issue was not then as prominent as it later
became. As discussed in chapter 5, environmental stewardship can, up
to a point, be ﬁtted into a pluralist logic of coexistence, but it can also
become a solidarist project. It might be argued that environmentalism
as a master institution is generating derivative institutions such as the
right to survival for all species.
Taking these additions into account, and focusing in on the particular
pattern of contemporary international institutions, is the task of table 3.
Here it is also possible to begin seeing roughly how primary and sec-
ondary institutions relate to each other, though I have not tried to trace
all of the cross-linkages where secondary institutions might well link to,
or express, more than one primary institution (e.g. the UNGA linking to
sovereignty, diplomacy, self-determination). Note also how in this more
speciﬁc focus the market and great power management move to the sta-
tus of primary institutions with their own derivatives. Again, as with
table 2, I offer this interpretation as a way of opening a discussion that
the English school, and others interested in international institutions,
need to have.
I will look in more detail at the institutions of contemporary inter-
national society, and the dynamics that drive them, in chapter 8. There
remains the question of exploring the path opened by Bull, James and
Reus-Smit towards a functional understanding of primary institutions.
One couldalsoderive functional leanings from thediscussionabout con-
stitutive rules being what deﬁne the players and the rules of the game.
Heading in that direction requires abandoning the empirical, inductive
approach with which I started, and turning towards a more deductive
186
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 10:56:05 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616617.009
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
The primary institutions of international society
Table 3. Contemporary international institutions
Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions
Master Derivative (examples of)
Sovereignty Non-intervention UN General Assembly
International law Most regimes, ICJ, ICC
Territoriality Boundaries Some PKOs
Diplomacy Bilateralism Embassies
Multilateralism United Nations
Conferences
Most IGOs, regimes
Great power
management
Alliances NATO
War UN Security Council
Balance of power
Equality of people Human rights UNHCR
Humanitarian
intervention
Market Trade liberalisation GATT/WTO, MFN
agreements
Financial liberalisation
Hegemonic stability
IBRD, IMF, BIS
Nationalism Self-determination Some PKOs
Popular sovereignty
Democracy
Environmental
stewardship
Species survival
Climate stability
CITES, UNFCCC,
Kyoto Protocol, IPCC,
Montreal Protocol, etc.
approach. JackDonnelly (2002: 21–3)hasmade apreliminary startdown
this path, choosing a functional logic as a way both of building on Bull’s
understanding of society, and of addressing the manifest shortcomings
of the English school’s simple lists. Without giving much explanation
as to why, he offers ﬁve types of political functions as ‘likely to be per-
formed in any international society’ and begins to allocate institutions
to them: communicating and interacting (diplomacy, heralds and messen-
gers, the ancient Greek practice of proxeny), making and applying rules
(international law), regulating the use of force (war, ‘just war’ rules, vari-
ous practices specifying the right to bear arms) aggregating interests and
power (alliances, spheres of inﬂuence, IGOs, feudal obligations, religious
solidarity), and allocating jurisdiction and establishing status (sovereignty,
suzerainty, universal empire). Donnelly’s paper is his ﬁrst cut at a large
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project, and while understandably unsatisfactory in some respects at
this early stage, is nevertheless usefully suggestive, not least in starting
from the requirements of second-order (‘international’) societies rather
than assuming (as Bull does) that one can start from the requirements
of any form of society.
Unlike ﬁrst-order societies, second-order societies do not have to deal
with some basic human functions such as sex, birth and death. But be-
cause, unlike the individual humans who compose ﬁrst-order societies,
their entities are both collective and socially constructed, they do have
distinctive problems about communication and recognition. As James
andReus-Smit emphasise, second-order societies have aparticular need
to specifywhat kind(s) of collective actors are allowedmembership, and
what not. Since the entities are collective, they also need rules about
how communication is to be conducted, and which voice from within
is to be treated as authoritative. Beyond that, the obvious historic core
concerns of second-order societies are with war and commerce, which
are captured by Bull’s emphasis respectively on constraints on the use
of force, and allocation of property rights. To pursue either commerce
or restraints on the resort to war, necessitates bringing in Bull’s third
element of society which is understandings about the sanctity of agree-
ments. One could therefore start a functional analysis of the primary
institutions of international society with these ﬁve. In terms of the in-
stitutions discussed earlier in this chapter the allocations might go as
follows:
Membership – the importance of deﬁning the membership of a second-
order society was apparent in the discussion above about constitutive
rules and who the players/actors are. Membership partly overlaps
with Donnelly’s category of ‘allocating jurisdiction and establishing
status’, but also goes beyond it, potentially taking in such identity
issues as feudal obligations and religious solidarity, which Donnelly
places under ‘aggregating interests and power’. It is thus not just about
Bull’s constitutive rules, but also contains equality/inequality of peo-
ple (or not) and their derivatives, human rights/colonialism and dy-
nasticism; nationalism and its derivatives self-determination, popular
sovereignty and democracy, and other variations on the question of
identity that would bear on the ‘standard of civilisation’ that deter-
mines whether entities are admitted to or excluded from international
society.
Authoritative communication – this is close to Donnelly’s classiﬁcation,
and is mainly about diplomacy and its antecedents.
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Limits to the use of force – it is difﬁcult to make a tight distinction be-
tween this function and membership. It would obviously include many
of the classic Westphalian institutions emphasised by English school
pluralists: great power management, war, alliances, neutrality and bal-
ance of power. But at least for Westphalian-type interstate societies, it
would be difﬁcult to exclude from this function some of the institu-
tions that also determine membership, for example, colonialism, dy-
nasticism, and human rights. As I have argued elsewhere (Buzan 1996)
membership of international society has security implications in and of
itself, not necessarily guaranteeing survival, but giving some protection
against being treated as a terra nulliuswhose inhabitants canbe treatedas
non-human.
Allocation of property rights – curiously, Donnelly does not pick up this
aspect of Bull’s functional approach to society, thereby perpetuating
the English school’s neglect of the economic sector. Allocation of prop-
erty rights has both political and economic aspects, respectively about
who governs where, and who owns what. Whether these aspects can be
treated as distinct, as in Tilly’s (1990) counterpointing of coercion and
capital, or whether they are intertwined, as in Ruggie’s (1983) argument
that private property and sovereignty emerged together, remains con-
troversial. On the political side, the obvious Westphalian institutions
are territoriality and boundaries, though as the feudal model indicates,
this kind of hard territoriality is not the only way of allocating prop-
erty rights. On the economic side, property rights points towards the
institutions associated with trade and ﬁnance. In societies where the
environment has become an issue, institutions associated with steward-
ship would also come under this heading.
Sanctity of agreements – this is close to Donnelly’s ‘making and apply-
ing rules’ and is mainly about international law and its antecedents.
This discussion does no more than open the door on the question of
how to understand the primary institutions of international society in
functional terms. I do not have the space here to develop this line of
thinking further, but the desirability of doing so is apparent for at least
two reasons. First, a functional framing is one way of giving theoretical
grounding to the English school’s so far rather ad hoc and empirical
approach to institutions, and moreover doing so in terms that can be
linked intoBull’swork. Second,Donnelly isnodoubt correct in thinking
that a functional approach would greatly facilitate the Wight/Watson
project of comparing international societies across space and time. In the
meantime, it is useful to try to get a somewhat more systematic sense
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of the possible range of primary institutions beyond the Westphalian
model.Todo this oneneeds to look atdifferent types of interstate society
through the crude functional lens just established.
The range of institutions and the types of
international society
First-order (interhuman) societies are typically complicated, and may
well have large numbers of deﬁning institutions (Searle 1995). Second-
order societieswill typicallyhave fewermembers and fewer institutions,
but they can take many forms and shapes, and therefore even though
the number of primary institutions within any given international soci-
ety may be fairly small, the overall possibilities for such institutions are,
if not inﬁnite, at least very numerous. I am therefore unable to escape
the ‘etcetera’ problem for which I earlier pilloried Mayall and others,
although at least now one can see why. On the basis of the thin/thick
argument in chapter 5, onewould expect fewer institutions at theplural-
ist end of the spectrum and more at the solidarist end. Exactly what the
primary institutions of any given international society are is a matter for
close empirical enquiry conducted within functional guidelines. Holsti
is quite right to link the question of how to benchmark change in inter-
national systems to the study of the institutions that deﬁne what the so-
ciety is and what the rules of its game are. Especially in games where the
pieces are the players, institutions are open to change, whether change
of meaning and practice (e.g. sovereignty, war), or rise/decline of the
institution as such (e.g. market, colonialism).
Even with a functional frame, one cannot set out a deﬁnitive list of
primary institutions for all times and places, yet it is nevertheless inter-
esting and instructive to try to think through the question of primary
institutions in relation to the four types of interstate social order set out
in ﬁgure 5. In particular, such an exercise enables one to revisit the issue
of change in the context of the idea from the discussion of pluralism
and solidarism above, that solidarist forms of interstate society at least
initially build on pluralist foundations. One has to keep in mind that
each model can in principle be held together by any mix of coercion,
calculation and belief.
A Power Political interstate society was deﬁned as based largely on
enmity and the possibility of war, and therefore as thin in terms of
primary institutions. Survival is the main motive for the states, and
no values are necessarily shared. Secondary institutions are unlikely to
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exist at all. At a minimum a Power Political society will require means
of authoritative communication, even if only for alliance making, and
therefore some form of diplomacy. By historical experience, there is
also likely to be some institutionalisation around property rights. Trade
becomes an institution when there is shared practice for granting par-
ticular rights to merchants, which was common even in ancient and
classical times (Buzan and Little 2000). It is easy to ﬁnd historical cases
where diplomacy and trade existed without there being any shared
political principle. It also seems likely that some sort of territoriality
would be important because of its intrinsic relationship to the pro-
cesses of war and conquest, though this might well not take the form
of hard boundaries. Empires and tribes usually have fuzzy frontiers
rather than ﬁxed lines. In such a thin society, there may well not be
much elaboration around the rules of membership. Sovereignty might
or might not be an institution in a Hobbesian society, which could just
as easily rest on suzerainty, or even on the simple pragmatic test of
whatever kind of entity is able to ﬁeld signiﬁcant military force. In
most of ancient and classical times, for example, international systems
were composed of a mix of city-states, empires, nomadic barbarians
and hunter-gatherer bands. This does not rule out that Power Political
interstate societies could also feature shared political institutions such
as dynasticism or suzerainty, as they did for much of classical history
and also early modern European history. By deﬁnition, Power Political
interstate societies are unlikely to feature major constraints on the use
of force, though war may well be a strong candidate for an institution
in the sense of a general acceptance of conquest as a legitimate way
to establish political claims. Any society will require some method of
establishing the sanctity of agreements, even if only the value placed
on ‘word of honour’, but the ruthless survivalism of a Power Political
one is unlikely to feature much in the way of developed international
law.
A Coexistence interstate society was deﬁned as based on the model
of a Westphalian balance of power system in which the balance of
power is accepted as an organising principle by the great powers, and
sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war
and international law are the core institutions of international society.
This is Bull’s pluralist international society, close to the experience of
modern European history up to 1945. In functional terms, these clas-
sic institutions already cover a quite well-developed means of author-
itative communication (diplomacy), membership (sovereignty), limits
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to the use of force (war, balance of power, great power management),
property rights (territoriality) and sanctity of agreements (international
law). Yet the classical pluralist presentation of institutions in the En-
glish school literature does not exhaust the possibilities. In terms of
membership, colonialism is an option for such a society provided that it
has room to expand outside its core (Holsti 2002; Keene 2000, 2002),
and so also is dynasticism, as it was in Europe well into the nine-
teenth century. A ‘standard of civilisation’ embodying other cultural
and/or religious identity markers might well also be applied to mem-
bership, as it was by the Europeans before 1945. In terms of property
rights, Coexistence interstate societies can also generate economic in-
stitutions more sophisticated than the basic trading practices that can
be found even in Power Political interstate societies. Coexistence
interstate societies might well keep the mercantilist practices and
principles inherited from Power Political forebears, but they might
also seek to improve on them. In the case of nineteenth-century
Europe, the Gold Standard could be seen as one such development,
as, perhaps, could the attempts to move towards liberal trading prac-
tices, such as agreed tariff reductions and most-favoured-nation agree-
ments. As Coexistence societies move towards the Cooperative model,
they may well begin to generate secondary institutions in the form
of regimes and IGOs, as began to happen during the late nineteenth
century.
The most important institution missing from the English school’s es-
sentially Coexistence set is nationalism, which bears on both member-
ship and the political side of property rights. Mayall (1990, 2000) has
long been the champion of giving full recognition to this as a constitu-
tive institution, arguing that during the nineteenth century it melded
with the institution of sovereignty and transformed it in a number of
quite fundamentalways.National self-determinationnotonlydisplaced
dynasticism as the key to political legitimacy, it also sacralised terri-
tory (Mayall 2000: 84) and imposed limits on the legitimate uses of war.
Hurrell (2002a: 145) reinforcesMayall’spositionwithhis suggestion that
‘national self-determination is the most important constitutive norm of
the modern era’. Nationalism, like sovereignty, has spread well beyond
its European origins. It has been instrumental in the demise of colo-
nialism as an institution of Western interstate society. It is part of the
explanation for the decline of war as an institution, and through its link
to popular sovereignty is also implicated in the rise of the solidarist
agendas of human rights and democracy.
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ACooperative interstate societywasdeﬁned as basedondevelopments
that go signiﬁcantly beyond coexistence, but short of extensive domes-
tic convergence. This deﬁnition implies a considerable carry-over of
institutions from the Coexistence model, and it would be surprising if
a Cooperative interstate society did not possess a fairly rich collection
of secondary institutions. It is not difﬁcult to imagine that sovereignty,
territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy and international law remain in
place, albeit with some elaboration and reinterpretation. Judging by
the UN Charter, the practices within the EU, and the still vigorous
and interesting debate about unipolarity and multipolarity, great power
management can also remain in place. It seems highly likely, however,
that Cooperative interstate societies will have more elaborate criteria
for membership, more stringent institutions concerning the sanctity of
agreements, and greater restraints on the use of force. Indeed, such soci-
etiesmaywell downgrade or even eliminatewar as an institution.Recall
Mayall’s (2000: 19) remark that in the twentieth century war became re-
garded more as the breakdown of international society than as a sign
of its operation. If interstate society is engaged in solidarist cooperative
projects, then allowing free scope for war as a legitimate way of chang-
ing political control becomes problematic. Neither the liberal economic
project nor the big science one can be pursued, at least not universally,
in an interstate society where war remains one of the core institutions.
War may not be eliminated, but its legitimate use gets squeezed into a
relatively narrow range closely centred on the right to self-defence, and
not in violation of the right of national self-determination. The squeez-
ing of war in this way seems likely to downgrade the balance of power
as an institution, at least in the robust sense of its meaning in a Coex-
istence interstate society. In the contemporary international system, this
whole nexus of questions is under test by the apparent desire of the US
to reassert a right to war for the purposes of combating terrorism and
containing rogue states.
Whether and how downgrading of balance of power happens may
well depend on what kind of solidarist project(s) a Cooperative inter-
state society pursues, and the question of what other primary institu-
tions such a society might have also hangs on this question. It will make
a difference whether the joint project is big science, human rights, col-
lective security, the pursuit of joint economic gain, environmentalism,
universal religion or some combination of these or others. If contempo-
rary Western interstate society is taken as a model for the possibilities,
then the most obvious candidate for elevation to the status of primary
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institutionwouldbe themarket.Themarketmeansmore than just trade.
It is a principle of organisation and legitimation that affects both how
states deﬁne and constitute themselves, what kind of other actors they
give standing to, and how they interpret sovereignty and territorial-
ity. The market does not necessarily eliminate balance of power as an
institution, but it does make its operation much more complicated and
contradictory than itwouldbeundermercantilist rules. I have elsewhere
(Buzan and Wæver 2003) labelled this the liberal–realist dilemma, and it
is most visible in contemporary Western, Japanese and Taiwanese rela-
tions with China. Realist, or balancing, logic suggests that it is unwise to
trade with, and invest in, and thus empower, states one may later have
to ﬁght. Liberal, or market, logic suggests that one can reduce the prob-
ability of having to ﬁght by allowing the operation of a market economy
to democratise and entangle potential enemies.
A Convergence interstate society was deﬁned as based on the devel-
opment of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of
states to make them adopt similar political, legal and economic forms.
This implies not only a thick development of institutions across all the
functions, but also extremely exacting conditions for membership. Ex-
actly what this type of society would look like depends hugely on what
model of political economy its member states were converging around:
liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, absolutist hereditary monarchy,
hierarchical empire, communist totalitarianism, etc. This choice would
largely determine the practices and legal systems that would deﬁne
the institutions. Some pluralist institutions might well still be in play,
though it seems unlikely that war and balance of power would play
much of a role. In a liberal (Kantian) version of Convergence interstate
society, the market, property rights, human rights and democratic rela-
tions between government and citizens might well feature as primary
institutions. But if the convergence model was Islamic, communist or
some other, then the institutions would be radically different. All three
of these forms would probably bring sovereignty and territoriality se-
riously into question, not necessarily, in Holsti’s (2002: 8–9) scheme, by
making themobsolete, but eitherby increasing their complexity or trans-
forming theirmain functions.Convergencewouldalmost certainlypush
non-intervention as a corollary of sovereignty towards obsolescence for
many purposes. As Convergence developments moved towards Con-
federalism, and the border between international systems and uniﬁed
ones, one would expect a change in the character of its secondary insti-
tutions. There would not just be signiﬁcant IGOs of the forum kind, like
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the UN, but also secondary institutions of a more integrative sort, like
those in the EU. By this stage, restraints on the use of force would have
to be nearly total, diplomacy largely transformed into something more
like the process of domestic politics, and international law transformed
into something more like domestic law, with institutions of enforce-
ment to back it up. One can draw from this discussion the following
conclusions.
 That it is possible, using a functional frame, to go some way towards
identifying the institutions that would go along with different forms
of macro, second-order, societies, but that the possible range of such
societies is large, and all of their particularities impossible to predict.
 That norms, and therefore institutions, can change. This change may
be driven by changes in the domestic societies of the member states,
or as Hurrell (2002a: 146–7) argues about contemporary international
society, by promotion by TNAs, by the discursive tendency of norms
to expand byﬁlling in gaps, by analogy, by responses to newproblems
and/or by debate in IGOs.
 That there are ‘master institutions’ in the sense that some primary
institutions nest inside others, but not in the sense that some are con-
stitutive and others regulatory.
 That while solidarist evolution does build on pluralist foundations
initially, it does so not just by direct accumulation, but as solidarism
thickens, by dropping or downgrading or transforming some key
pluralist institutions.
 That as Hurrell (2002a: 143–4) observes, the set of institutions
constituting any given interstate society may well contain contra-
dictions/tensions among themselves. These contradictions/tensions
may well be a key dynamic in the evolution (or decay) of any given
interstate society. More on this in chapter 8.
 Thatoneneeds tobewareof the limitationsofapurelypolitico-military
approach to conceptualising institutions. Economic, societal and envi-
ronmental institutions can be just as constitutive of players and rules
of the game in interstate societies as can the narrow set of strictly
politico-military ones.
Conclusions
Three issues remain to be discussed: (1) the relationship, if any, between
institutions in the English school sense, and more materialist structural
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interpretations of the same phenomena; (2) the question left hanging in
chapter 4 of how the interhuman, transnational and interstate domains
relate to each other; and (3) the vocabulary question, also left hanging
in chapter 4, about the fate of the concepts ‘international’ and ‘world’
society.
In the discussion of primary institutions above it was noted that war
as an institution became more problematic as interstate society moved
away from pluralist constructions and towards solidarist ones. This
problematisation was not to do with technical issues such as the ad-
vent of weapons of mass destruction, which might well bring war into
question even within Hobbesian or Lockean interstate societies. Rather,
it concerned the contradiction between war as an institution, and the
other institutions that might be cultivated by more solidarist interstate
societies. War become increasingly incompatible with solidarist projects
such as big science or the institutionalisation of the market. How is one
to link this perspective to the more materialist one made famous by
Tilly’s phrase that ‘war makes the state and the state makes war’, which
implicitly underpins much realist theorising about international rela-
tions? From this perspective, war is constitutive of states not in the
form of a constitutive rule, but as a mechanical, Darwinian structure
which favours the survival of units that are more like modern states,
and drives into extinction or subordination other (older) types of unit
that are less clearlyorganised around strict sovereignty andhardbound-
aries. If war itself gets driven towards extinction, what then becomes of
the state?Although the logicsdriving this type of structural thinking are
different from those underpinning primary institutions in the English
school sense, the two do cross paths when one comes to consider the
impact of the market. Like war, the market can be seen both as a me-
chanical structure and as an institution of interstate (and interhuman
and transnational) society. In both perspectives there are some areas
of overlap and complementarity between the two, but also an underly-
ing contradiction that becomesmorepowerful as themarket approaches
global scale.Warmight,up to apoint, support themarketwhen thegame
is to grab control of sub-global shares. But when the market becomes
global, war becomes a costly disruption to trade, production and ﬁnan-
cial markets. As institutions, war and the market become increasingly
incompatible in solidarist interstate societies. As mechanical structures,
they seem also to fall into a zero-sum game for what makes the state
and what the state makes. It could well be argued that in contemporary
interstate societies it is the market that makes the state and the state that
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makesmarkets.To the extent that this is true the shift in balance between
these two constitutes not just a shift in the institutions of interstate so-
ciety, but also a transformation in the Darwinian structures that shape
the principal units in the international system (Buzan and Little 2000:
362–7).
The second issue is how the interhuman, transnational and interstate
domains relate to each other. The main point I want to underline here
is the need to remain aware that liberal models of solidarism are not
the only option for thinking about this question. From a contemporary
Westernperspective, inside liberalism, it is all tooeasy to lose sight of this
fact. The liberal model of solidarism offers a very particular, and quite
compelling, answer to how the interhuman, transnational and interstate
will relate to each other as solidarism develops. Liberal arguments con-
tain a strong logic that although the three units of individuals, TNAs
and states are ontologically distinct, the interhuman, transnational and
interstate societies that they form will be closely interrelated in a quite
particular way.
As I have argued elsewhere (Buzan 1993) there are grounds for think-
ing that interstate societies aspiring to solidarism, especially if their
constitutent states are democratic, will have to be accompanied by
matching elements of cosmopolitan world society among their citizens
if the solidarist international society is to be sustainable. In other words,
the twentieth century’s obsession with nationalism as the link between
the interhuman and the interstate domains has to be broadened out to
incorporate the wider forms of interhuman society necessary to support
a solidarist interstate agenda, whether in human rights, democracy or
economic interdependence/globalisation. In addition,pursuit of the lib-
eral economic project necessitates the creation and support of a host of
transnational economic actors. In parallel with these developments in
identity and economy, liberal interstate societies will need to promote
(and/or allow) the development of a corresponding transnational civil
society sufﬁcient to carry the political burden created by moves into
wider identities and more global markets. And while liberal solidarist
interstate societies will need to encourage transnational civil society, the
states composing them will need to adapt themselves by creating IGOs
to deal with the forces of transnational uncivil society to which the pro-
cesses of integration also give space.Amongst other things,dealingwith
transnational uncivil society can lead to reformulations of the institu-
tion of war, as visible in the post-2001 ‘war on terrorism’ (Buzan 2003).
Liberal solidarism will be unable to develop far unless the interstate
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domain can carry with it degrees and types of interhuman and transna-
tional society appropriate to the degree and type of norms, rules, insti-
tutions and identities that they want to share amongst their members.
A liberal interstate society will require parallel developments of cos-
mopolitanism in the interhuman domain, and of economic and civil so-
ciety actors in the transnational domain.Without suchdevelopments the
pursuit of the interstate project will be impossible beyond a rather basic
level. In a liberal perspective, more interstate solidarism requires more
cosmopolitanism in the interhuman domain and more TNAs, and coop-
eration amongst TNAs to support it. Conversely, the desired cosmopoli-
tan developments in the interhuman and transnational domains cannot
take place without the provision of law, order and security from the in-
terstate domain. Liberal solidarism develops as a close nexus amongst
the three domains.
The EU provides an instructive case for investigating this liberal
nexus. Its ongoing debate about the tension between further integration
of theEU (i.e.deepeningof its internationaland transnational society) on
the one hand, and the absence of any strong European identity amongst
its citizens (i.e. lagging development in the interhuman domain), on
the other (Smith 1992), and the endless debates about the EU’s sec-
ondary institutions from police to parliament, all provide an advanced
case study for looking at the development of liberal solidarism. Among
other things, the EU case raises the question of where the driving forces
for the development of international society are located. The EU has
been primarily state-led, which explains why the interhuman domain
is the laggard. In other cases one might ﬁnd the driving forces within
the interhuman or transnational domains.
Through liberal lenses, it looks to be the case that as one moves to-
wards the (con)federative end of the interstate society spectrum ever
more room is created for interhuman and transnational society. It also
appears that the interstate development depends on progress in the
other two, and at least in the minds of the more extreme sorts of global-
ists, that the process/progress might/should (if it has not already . . .)
eventually topple the state as the dominant unit in the international sys-
tem. That the three domains have historically interacted with each other
is beyond question. For example, the present scale of interhuman soci-
eties was heavily shaped by the inﬂuence of earlier TNAs (the Catholic
and Orthodox churches) and states/empires (Rome, China, Abbasid).
In turn, these collective actorsdepended in their time on being able to tie
their own organisation and legitimacy to the structures of interhuman
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society. In a realistworld of competitive states,national states (those that
make their subjects into citizens, and deﬁne themselves in terms of pop-
ular sovereignty) will outperform absolutist states both economically
and militarily. The dynamics of the interstate society will thus work to
make interhuman society conform to its political geography (both in
terms of nationalism, and wider, interstate society developments such
as the EU, the West, the Communist bloc etc.). But how the three do-
mains interact with each other depends on what sort of values are in
play, and where they are located. Liberal values encourage a broadly
complementary relationship amongst the three, making developments
in each dependent on matching developments in the other two. But
even within liberalism more contradictory readings are possible. It can
be argued that empowering transnational capitalist actors unleashes
forces that not only assault patterns of identity in the interhuman do-
main, but also tend to atomise the interhuman world into individuals
(consumers). Capitalist transnationals can also be seen as contradic-
tory to the state, tending to hollow it out and shrink its domains of
legitimate action. The liberal model, in sum, can raise a highly political
agenda in which developments in one domain force quite extreme pat-
terns on the other two, and the nature of these questions may well vary
depending on the stage of development that liberalism is in (whether
national, as in the nineteenth century, or globalist, as in the twenty-
ﬁrst).
Similar sorts of thought exercises could be conducted for non-liberal
international societies. Islamic values, for example, could also be read as
weakening the state domain by placing individual loyalty to the umma
above the loyalty of citizens to states. The oft-told story of how a West-
phalian states-system emerged out of European medievalism displays
similar tensions between the demands of a universal religion on the one
hand, and the demands of state sovereignty on the other. In the political
sphere there was a zero-sum game between the emergent states and the
Catholic church – between the interstate and transnational domains of
society. It seems clear that in a communist interstate society there would
be little or no room for TNAs, and strong assaults on religious and na-
tional identities in the interhuman domain. From the historical record,
classical empires tended to constrain the development of transnational
economic actors, and oftendid not care toomuch aboutpatterns of iden-
tity in the interhuman domain (being more concerned with obedience
than identity). In sum, the liberal model is not the only template on
which one can and should think about the relationship among the three
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domains. Even within the liberal model, different interpretations of the
relationship are possible according towhich ideological perspective one
takes on capitalism.
This brief look at alternatives also underlines the question about
where the driving forces for the social structure of international sys-
tems are located. Physical interaction capacity obviously matters, for
the technical ability to move goods, people and information around the
system conditions the opportunities of actors in all the domains and
across all of history. The work of tracing this factor across history has
been done by Buzan and Little (2000). Beyond that, the question of driv-
ing forces turns towhich, if any, of thedomainsdominates the other two.
Is it that developments in the state pillar push and pull developments
in the transnational and interhuman domains? Or is it that autonomous
developments in the interhuman domain (the rise of a consciousness
of being a member of humankind) and the transnational one (the rise
of powerful TNAs of various kinds) force the state domain to adapt?
Even within the liberal model, this chicken–egg problem presents itself.
Most realists will take the view that states are the drivers, many glo-
balists that the interhuman and transnational domains are taking over.
Campaigners for solidarist developments will try to mobilise the in-
terhuman domain to inﬂuence the transnational one, and use both to
inﬂuence states. Or, depending on issues and circumstances, they may
try to mobilise the state to inﬂuence the transnational and interhuman
domains. Both the realist and globalist positions contain elements of the
truth, but the argument between them is more interesting as a political
phenomenon than as an analytical question.
What is interesting analytically are the constraints and opportunities
that developments in any one of these domains pose for the other two.
Embedded patterns in the interhuman domain might act as a brake on
or a facilitator for, developments towards deeper forms of interstate
society, the difference depending on the geographical overlap, or not,
of the relevant patterns in the two domains. A good example of this
is the classical English school question about the relationship between
interstate society andunderlying cultural patterns.The assumptionwas
that an underlying civilisational pattern would facilitate the develop-
ment of an interstate society (classical Greece, early-modern Europe)
whereas the lack thereof would be a problem (the expansion of West-
ern interstate society to global scale). Similarly, the character of inter-
state society very much conditions the possibilities for TNAs, but once
they are established and powerful, TNAs also condition and restrain the
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possibilities for interstate society. The units in each domain have to op-
erate in the conditions created by theunits in the other twodomains, but
the units in each domain can, up to a point, and given time, also shape
the nature of the other two domains. This is a highly dynamic universe
in which agents and structure are engaged in a continuous game of
mutual tensions and mutual constitutions. Both complementarities and
contradictions are possible. Liberal solidarism must have supporting
cosmopolitan and transnational developments. A communist interstate
society is hard to envisage in a world in which transnational actors
are strong, but a communist world society in which the communist
party is the primary institution, and the state has atrophied, is just about
possible to imagine. In this sense it is difﬁcult to imagine developments
in any one domain getting too far out of line with developments in the
other two, and easy to see that some primary institutions necessarily
extend beyond the strictly interstate domain. The range of possibilities
is large. Some types of solidarist societies will require big developments
in the transnational domain, others not.
Although I have argued that there is a lot of room for interplay among
the three domains, it remains true in the contemporary world that states
are still the most powerful and focused unit: states can shove and shape
the others more easily than they can be shoved and shaped by them.
But this is far from saying that states can shape the other two domains
as they wish. Change is at best slow, and powers of resistance can be
great. Politics, leadership, imagination and a host of other factors affect
the way in which the three domains play into each other, and whether
opportunities for change get taken up, or whether possibilities for re-
sistance are effective or not. It is probably not possible to postulate a
mechanical set of relationships among the three domains. What is pos-
sible is to set a mechanism of analysis that ensures that this relation-
ship, and the changes in it, become a central focus of any examina-
tion of international social structures. I will have a ﬁrst crack at this
in chapter 8.
The other question left over from chapter 4 was the fate of the
terms ‘international’ and ‘world’ society. World society disappeared in
chapter 4 (p. 138) because of thedecision to separate the interhuman and
the transnational into two distinct analytical domains. International so-
ciety has disappeared because the triad in ﬁgures 4 and 5 is now based
on types of unit, making the term ‘interstate’ a necessary tightening up
of usage (and reﬂecting more traditional English school formulations
such as ‘society of states’ or ‘states-systems’). The term ‘international’,
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though often used to mean interstate, has always carried a certain ambi-
guity (Buzan and Little 2000: 32–3) which makes it awkward to use as a
label for the strictly state-based domain. But given that there does seem
to be considerable institutional linkage among the three domains, the
ambiguity of ‘international’ becomes useful. There is a need for terms
to encompass the complex patterns that result when one looks at the
interhuman, transnational and interstate domains all together.
Myproposal is touse international society to indicate something like the
arrangement that emerged during the twentieth century (Mayall 2000:
17–25), where the basic political and legal frame is set by the states-
system, with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within
the order deﬁned by interstate society. This would roughly accord with
James’s view cited above that individuals and TNAs are participants in
international society rather thanmembers of it, orwith the arguments in
chapter 2 about individuals being dependent ‘objects’ of international
law rather than independent ‘subjects’ of it with standing in their own
right. It also feels close to the alternative interpretation of Bull (given on
pp. 95–6), where following his imperative about ‘international order’
in the conditions prevailing in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, could lead
one to a Davos-culture view of who it is that now provides it. This usage
takes advantage of both the ambiguity and the state-centrism built into
the term ‘international’.Deﬁning international society in thiswaymeans
that the term cannot be applied to the classical Westphalian period of
European history. The resolute pluralism of that period, the relative ab-
sence of TNAs and political nationalism, and the widespread disregard
for the interhuman sector displayed by slavery, imperial expropriation
and on occasions genocide, mark the Westphalian system as an inter-
state society well towards the Power Political side of the Coexistence
model. There may well have been some institutions in the interhuman
and transnational domains, but these would not have been closely tied
into those in the interstate domain.
Following this reasoning, world society then becomes a vehicle for
dropping the assumption that states are the dominant units, and inter-
state society thedominantdomain. Inworld societies,noone of the three
domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two, but all are in
play together. This feels close to Bull’s neomedieval idea, and to that
one of Vincent’s versions of world society that hinged on a rights-based
community among states, individuals and TNAs (see chapter 2, and
Gonzalez-Pelaez 2002: 38–41, 246–9). Buzan and Little (2000: 365–7, 414)
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discuss something close to it under the label postmodern international
society. Given my criticisms of Vincent for his lack of clarity about the
boundary between international and world society this move will strike
some readers as sweetly ironic. But Vincent used world society in sev-
eral senses, perhaps the main one taking off from the Wightian idea
of opposition to international society. The usage proposed here does
maintain the same blurring of boundaries between international and
world society in traditional English school usage, but it proceeds from
a position in which the traditional meanings of international and world
society have been abandoned. Neither does it carry any of Vincent’s
and Wight’s sense of opposition to, and/or exclusion from, interstate
society. A world society in my sense would be based on principles of
functional differentiation amongst the various types of entities in play,
and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types
of unit in relation both to each other and to different types. States and
ﬁrms, for example, would have to accept the historical evidence that
neither performs efﬁciently when it tries to do the other’s job, and that
their respective legal rights and obligations need to be clearly demar-
cated. Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as hold-
ing legal and political status independently, not as a gift from either of
the others. Individuals and ﬁrms would thus become subjects of inter-
national law in their own right. Humankind has not yet seen a world
society in this sense, though the EU may be heading in that direction.
Such a development is certainly within the range of imagination, and it
presents a farmoreplausible and engaging goal than the oversimpliﬁca-
tions of anarchists, hyperliberals, hyperglobalists and dyed-in-the-wool
realistswho can only see the future in terms of the victory of onedomain
over the others.
Using these deﬁnitions, international and world society come back
into play carrying speciﬁc, clearly deﬁned meanings and representing
an important distinction of relevance to contemporary world politics.
That said, one might still complain, rightly, that my deﬁnitions leave
gaps in the labelling scheme. Logically, one would also have to have la-
bels for situations in which either of the non-state domains dominated
over the other two. It might also be possible to imagine situations in
which one would simply need to discuss the three domains separately,
without bundling them together in some linking classiﬁcation. For the
reasons already argued in chapter 4, scenarios of non-state dominance
are hard to imagine, and seem unlikely. Unbundled scenarios probably
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require introduction of the geographic variable, which is the subject of
chapter 7. On reﬂection, therefore, it seems to me that interstate, inter-
national and world society, plus the option to discuss interstate, inter-
human and transnational separately, cover almost all of the interesting
cases whether historical, contemporary or foreseeable within the next
few decades.
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